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are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the failure of appointed trial counsel to 
object to the State's presentation of evidence of Defendant's 
other crimes, wrongs or acts. These failures precluded Defendant 
of a fair trial. 
The State charged Mr. Silva with Aggravated Assault, a third-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103. On 
April 25, 2005, Mr. Silva appeared before the district court and 
pleaded not guilty. 
Mr. Silva appeared for a jury trial on May 25, 2005. Upon 
the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. Silva as charged. 
At the sentencing hearing on July 26, 2005, the trial court 
first took Mr. Silva's guilty plea in State v. Silva, Case No. 
051700983, during which Mr. Silva pleaded guilty to one court of 
witness tampering, a third degree felony. The trial court then 
sentenced Mr. Silva to two indeterminate terms "of zero to five 
years" for aggravated assault and witness tampering to run 
concurrent. 
On August 25, 2005, Mr. Silva, through appointed appellate 
counsel, filed Notice of Appeal 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. Silva was charged with Aggravated Assault, a third-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (R. 1-2). 
See Information, R. 1-2, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum A. 
2. On April 25, 2005, Mr. Silva appeared before the 
district court and pleaded not guilty (R. 9-10) . 
3. Mr. Silva appeared for a jury trial on May 25, 2005 (R. 
30-32) . 
4. After jury selection, in the course of handling various 
matters, Mr. Silva's appointed trial counsel alerted the trial 
court about the following: 
MR. PETERSON: I just wanted to make sure the Court and 
Mr. Poll was [sic] aware of that. The 
second issue I have is that we've gone 
to fairly significant lengths to insure 
Mr. Silva is presentable and that the 
jury in [sic] aware that he is at the 
jail or incarcerated at this time. Mr. 
Poll indicated when he stated who his 
witnesses are and I didn't want to jump 
up right then and make matters worse 
that one of his witnesses was someone 
that worked at the Davis County Jail. I 
think when he's called, it ought to be 
in context that he's a Davis County 
Deputy Sheriff and not a jailer and I 
think we can work through the semantics 
at that point in time if he needs to be 
called at all. 
THE COURT: I'd agree with that. 
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(R. 124:44-45). After further discussion of the matter, the trial 
court advised the parties to instruct their witnesses unot to say 
anything about incarceration." (R. 124:46:13-15). 
5. At trial, the State, as part of its case in chief, 
called Mr. Denny Bassett as a witness (R. 124:88:20). 
6. During the course of the direct examination of Mr. 
Bassett, the State elicited the following testimony: 
THE STATE: I asked you earlier if you had talked to 
[Mr. Silva] and how did you know that 
you were talking to him? 
MR, BASSETTJ I heard the answer machine say, "Collect 
call from Boston, or Joey Silva" or it 
would say "Boston Paul" whatever but it 
says that out loud like it's a machine 
so . . ." 
THE STATE: 
MR, BASSETTJ 
THE STATE: 
MR, BASSETTi 
And what did he say on the phone? 
On the phone? We'd screen the calls 
like that 'cause there's a couple of 
people that would call from the county 
jail. When they'd pick up when I'd 
start talking. 
When you got on the phone what did he 
say? 
He's say like "What's up, fucker?" And 
I'm like, nothing. I don't really 
remember much of the rest of the 
conversation besides he was like what's 
going on like a lame day and he was like 
he said he talked to his attorney and if 
I didn't go that he'd be set free. 
MR, PETERSON: Objection, non-responsive. 
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THE STATE: I specifically asked him -
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. You may 
continued [sic]. 
THE STATE: If you didn't go where? 
MR. BASSETT: To court he'd just be set free because 
they needed to subpoena me for me to be 
able to go to court. 
(R. 124:102-03). 
7. Defense counsel did not object to the incarceration or 
witness tampering references. 
8. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted Mr. Silva 
as charged (R. 125:274:10-14; R. 84). 
« 
9. At the sentencing hearing on July 26, 2005, the trial 
court first took Mr. Silva's guilty plea in State v. Silva, Case 
No. 051700983, during which Mr. Silva pleaded guilty to one court 
of witness tampering, a third degree felony (07/26/05:28-31). 
Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Mr. Silva to two 
indeterminate terms "of zero to five years" for aggravated assault 
and witness tampering to run concurrent (07/26/05:33:7-12). See 
Sentence, Judgment, Commitment, R. 99-101, a true and correct copy 
of which is attached hereto as Addendum B. 
10. On August 25, 2 0 05, Mr. Silva, through appointed 
appellate counsel, filed Notice of Appeal (R. 103-06) . 
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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appointed trial counsel denied Mr. Silva of his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing 
to object to evidence of Mr. Silva's other crimes, wrongs or acts. 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to object to the State's 
presentation of evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration and the 
alleged witness tampering fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated by 
existing Utah case law and the underlying factual circumstances of 
this case. But for counsel's unprofessional errors of failing to 
object to the evidence of Mr. Silva's other crimes or wrong acts, 
the result at trial would have been different. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MR. SILVA OF HIS 
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO EVIDENCE OF 
OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS OR ACTS• 
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 
(1984), The United States Supreme Court, established a two-prong 
test for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment1 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
xThe Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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S.Ct. at 2 064. According to this test, which was adopted by Utah 
courts, a defendant must show "first, that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant." Bundy v. Deland, 763 P. 2d 803, 805 
(Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995); State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
" [T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized 
not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the 
ability of the accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, 
a fair sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 
S.Ct. 838, 842, (1993). 
In order to satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant 
must uxidentify the acts or omissions' which, under the 
circumstances, 'show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 
P,2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 
688, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). Moreover, a 
defendant must "overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), 
cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
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To demonstrate prejudice under the second prong of the test, 
a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
A. Legal Principles Governing the Admissibility 
of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts 
A person, as a fundamental principle of law, may be convicted 
criminally only for his or her acts and not for his or her general 
character. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, fl5, 992 P.2d 951. 
w[I]f a conviction is based on an inference that [the] conviction 
is justified because of the defendant's criminal character or 
propensity to commit bad acts", this fundamental principle is 
violated. Jd. "The admission of evidence of prior crimes may 
have such a powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to 
subvert the constitutional principle that a defendant may be 
convicted only if guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific 
crime charged." Jd. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 
S.Ct. 1068 (1970)). The law, consequently, has long prohibited 
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the admission of prior crime evidence unless the proffered 
evidence is probative of an issue other than criminal propensity 
or character and is not unduly prejudicial. Id. "The rule 
limiting the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes, as 
presently stated in rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, has 
existed for almost a century in this state." Id. (string citation 
omitted). Although the Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Decorso, 
1999 UT 57, H1J12-35, 993 P.2d 837, addressed and limited prior 
statements of the rule articulated in State v. Doporto, 935 P. 2d 
484 (Utah 1997), "the basic concepts embodied in the rule limiting 
the use of prior crime evidence remain intact." Id. 
B. Rule 404(b) Analysis of Admissibility 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 (b), which governs the admissibility 
of evidence of other crimes, wrongs or bad acts, provides that 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident . . . . 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b). Before deciding whether evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or bad acts is admissible under Rule 404(b), "the 
trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being 
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) 
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whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) 
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State 
v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, fl6, 6 P.3d 1120 (citing State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 1(21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837). 
"A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 404(b) is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard." State v. Allen, 
2005 UT 11, Hl5, 108 P.3d 730; State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, ^56, 52 
P. 3d 1210 (citing Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at fl8) . However, 
"admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be scrupulously 
examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of that 
discretion." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at i|l8 (citation omitted). 
After jury selection in the case at bar, in the course of 
handling various matters, Mr. Silva's appointed trial counsel 
alerted the trial court about the following: 
MR. PETERSON: I just wanted to make sure the Court and 
Mr. Poll was [sic] aware of that. The 
second issue I have is that we've gone 
to fairly significant lengths to insure 
Mr. Silva is presentable and that the 
jury in [sic] aware that he is at the 
jail or incarcerated at this time. Mr. 
Poll indicated when he stated who his 
witnesses are and I didn't want to jump 
up right then and make matters worse 
that one of his witnesses was someone 
that worked at the Davis County Jail. I 
think when he's called, it ought to be 
in context that he's a Davis County 
Deputy Sheriff and not a jailer and I 
think we can work through the semantics 
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at that point in time if he needs to be 
called at all. 
THE COURT: I'd agree with that. 
(R. 124:44-45). Following a discussion of the matter, the trial 
court advised the parties to instruct their witnesses "not to say 
anything about incarceration." (R. 124:46:13-15). 
In the instant case, the State, during the direct examination 
of Mr. Denny Bassett, wrongfully and needlessly elicited evidence 
of Mr. Silva's incarceration and of witness tampering allegations. 
By way of its direct examination of Mr. Bassett, the State 
elicited the following testimonial evidence: 
THE STATE: I asked you earlier if you had talked to 
[Mr. Silva] and how did you know that 
you were talking to him? 
MR. BASSETT: 
THE STATE: 
MR. BASSETTJ 
THE STATE: 
MR. BASSETT: 
I heard the answer machine say, "Collect 
call from Boston, or Joey Silva" or it 
would say "Boston Paul" whatever but it 
says that out loud like it's a machine 
so . . ." 
And what did he say on the phone? 
On the phone? We'd screen the calls 
like that 'cause there's a couple of 
people that would call from the county 
jail. When they'd pick up when I'd 
start talking. 
When you got on the phone what did he 
say? 
He's say like "What's up, fucker?" And 
I'm like, nothing. I don't really 
remember much of the rest of the 
11 
conversation besides he was like what's 
going on like a lame day and he was like 
he said he talked to his attorney and if 
I didn't go that he'd be set free. 
MR. PETERSON: Objection, non-responsive. 
THE STATE: I specifically asked him -
THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. You may 
continued [sic]. 
THE STATE: If you didn't go where? 
MR. BASSETT: To court he'd just be set free because 
they needed to subpoena me for me to be 
able to go to court.2 
(R. 124:102-03) (Emphasis added). Appointed trial counsel did not 
object to the incarceration or witness tampering references. 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to object to the State's 
presentation of evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration or alleged 
witness tampering fell below an objective standard of reasonable 
professional judgment. This is demonstrated by existing Utah case 
law and the underlying factual circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to object 
to the evidence of Mr. Silva's other crimes or wrong acts, namely, 
his incarceration and alleged witness tampering, the result at 
trial would have been different. Had appointed trial counsel 
objected, the trial court, under the first part of the 
2A true and correct copy of the transcript containing the 
testimony of Mr. Bassett is attached hereto as Addendum C. 
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aforementioned test of admissibility, would have abused its 
discretion had it admitted the evidence of Mr. Silva's 
incarceration. The same analysis applies to Mr. Silva's alleged 
witness tampering. 
Further, the record demonstrates that evidence of Mr. Silva's 
incarceration or alleged witness tampering was not offered for a 
non-character purpose. The evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration 
or alleged witness tampering does not satisfy the requirements of 
Utah Rule of Evidence 402.3 
The record demonstrates that the evidence of Mr. Silva's 
incarceration and alleged witness tampering was less than 
probative of any material fact to the crimes charged. Other than 
propensity to commit the crime, evidence of Mr. Silva's prior 
incarceration or the alleged witness tampering did not tend to 
prove a material fact of the crimes charged. 
Finally, had appointed trial counsel objected, the trial 
court would have erred if it had concluded that the evidence of 
Mr. Silva's incarceration or the alleged witness tampering met the 
3According to Rule 402, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible." Utah R. Evid. 402. u'Relevant evidence' means evidence 
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah R. Evid. 401. 
"Other crime evidence is admissible if it 'tends to prove some fact 
that is material to the crime charged--other than the defendant's 
propensity to commit crime.'" State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at f^56, 52 
P.3d 1210. 
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requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In State 
v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to 
the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which 
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Id. at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 
565 (3d ed. 1984)); see also Utah R. Evid. 403.4 The manner in 
which the evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration and alleged 
witness tampering were presented at trial increased the likelihood 
that the jury would and did convict Mr. Silva based on his 
criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts. 
The need for the evidence was extremely low, if not 
nonexistent, in the instant case. In short, the evidence of Mr. 
Silva's incarceration and the alleged witness tampering was 
unnecessary to the State's case, especially when considered in 
4Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
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light of the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury based solely on Mr. Silva's criminal 
character or propensity to commit bad acts. Moreover, in light of 
the factual circumstances of the case and the evidence presented 
at trial, the evidence of Mr. Silva's incarceration or the alleged 
witness tampering was unnecessary to the defense utilized at 
trial. See State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 89-90 (Utah), cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341 (1982); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
306. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Silva respectfully requests that 
this Court reverse his conviction and remand the case to the 
district court for a new trial and for any further proceedings or 
relief consistent with this Court's instructions as set forth in 
its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of^April, 2006. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this 6th day of 
April, 2006: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake C>C9>vUX 94114-0854 
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Tab A 
MELVIN C. WILSON tluCGHD 01S iR!C1 VObiU 
Davis County Attorney 
P.O.Box618 /035 APR II R 12- 01 
800 West State Street 
FarmingtonUT 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOEY L. SILVA 
DOB: 04/08/1968, 
Defendant. 
Bail: 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 
OTN17056409 QfRB 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, 
either directly or as a party, on or about April 08, 2005 at County of Davis, State of Utah, 
committed the crime of: 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, (137) 76-5-103 UCA, third degree felony, as 
follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did commit assault as defined in 
Utah Code § 76-5-102 and used a dangerous weapon or other means or force likely to produce 
death or serious bodily injury. 
This Information is based on evidence obtained from witness Brody Warren. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: The undersigned prosecutor is a Deputy 
Davis County Attorney and has received information from the investigating officer, Brody 
Warren of the Clearfield Police Department, and the information herein is based upon such 
personal observations and investigation of said officer. 
1. On April 8, 2005 defendant and several of his friends went to the home of the 
victim. While at the home, a fight broke out between one of defendant's friends and the victim. 
4/11/2005 information 
2. As the fight was occurring, defendant grabbed a baseball bat and struck the 
victim in the head and in the arm several times. 
Authorized April 11, 2005 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Jeptity Davis^6^nt5^Attorney 
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STATE OF UTAH, : MINUTES 
Plaintiff, : SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. 
JOEY L SILVA, 
Defendant, 
Custody: Bail 
Case No: 051700577 FS 
Judge: GLEN R. DAWSON 
Date: July 26, 2005 
PRESENT =• = 
Clerk: lanas • = 
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L ^ ^ g 
Defendant = a 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SMITH, DEE W -==== 
Agency: Adult Probation & Parole §*' * 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION h==± £ fc 
Date of birth: April 8, 1968 u?""^ «-» 
Video ;' 8 2 
Tape Number: 7-26-05 Tape Count: 3:29 I B B B 8" 
CHARGES £ = = = S 
1. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony *°- 8 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 05/25/2005 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the DAVIS County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Case No: 051700577 
Date: Jul 26, 2005 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The term may run concurrent with any term now serving. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $9250.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $4263.51 
Due: $9250.00 
Total Fine: $9250.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $4263.51 
Total Principal Due: $9250.00 
Plus Interest 
Fine payments are to be made to Board of Pardons Court. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $500.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: PUBLIC DEFENDER FEE DAVIS COUNTY TREASURER 
The amount of Attorney Fees is to be determined by 2nd District 
Court-Farmington. 
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE 
Public Defender fee is to be sent to the Office of State Debt 
Collection. 
Case No: 051700577 
Date: Jul 26, 2005 
Dated t h i s Q#*~day of Q o L . , 20O3T". 
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1 stating, implying that Mr. Silva made this statement. I 
2 don't think there's foundation to support that. 
3 THE COURT: Could you provide me some more 
4 foundation? 
5 Q (BY MR. POLL) I asked you earlier if you had 
6 talked to him and how did you know that you were talking to 
7 him? 
8 A I heard the answer machine say, "Collect call from 
9 Boston, or Joey Silva" or it would say "Boston Paul" whatever 
10 but it says that out loud like it's a machine so... 
11 Q And what did he say on the phone? 
12 A On the phone? We'd screen the calls like that 
13 ^cause there's a couple of people that would call from the 
14 county jail. When they'd pick up when I'd start talking. 
15 Q When you got on the phone what did he say? 
16 A He was like "What's up, fucker?" And I'm like, 
17 nothing. I don't really remember much of the rest of the 
18 conversation besides he was like what's going on like a lame 
19 day and he was like he said he talked to his attorney and if 
20 I didn't go that he'd be set free. 
21 MR. PETERSON: Objection, non-responsive. 
22 MR. POLL: I specifically asked him -
23 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. You may 
24 continued. 
25 Q (BY MR. POLL) If you didn't go where? 
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1 A To court he'd just be set free because they needed 
2 to subpoena me for me to be able to go to court. 
3 Q Did he talk to you about you getting a subpoena? 
4 A Yeah, he asked if I had gotten a subpoena and I 
5 said, no, that I hadn't been around my house or you know. 
6 Q What did he say about that? 
7 A That they needed to subpoena me and if they didn't 
8 subpoena me, I'd be alright. 
9 Q Did he talk to you about your house and what to do? 
10 A I don't recollect. 
11 Q One second. Did you tell him what you were going 
12 to do until that time? 
13 A I just said don't worry about it, I'm not going to 
14 court, that I wasn't going to do nothing. I wasn't going to 
15 like - like if they subpoenaed me then I would but I wasn't 
16 going to sit there and just show up. 
17 Q Okay. Did you tell him anything about what you 
18 were going to do pending that subpoena coming? 
19 A Pending, like after? 
20 Q No, before it came. Did you tell him what you were 
21 going to do? 
22 A Hide out or something? 
23 Q Yeah, did you tell him that? 
24 A I don't remember. I could have. I was - like I 
25 said, I was high a lot of the time and I... 
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